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Abstract
Workers in less-secure jobs are often paid less than identical-looking workers in more secure jobs.
We show that this lack of compensating differentials for unemployment risk can arise in equilibrium
when all workers are identical and firms differ only in job security (i.e. the probability that the worker
is not sent into unemployment). In a setting where workers search for new positions both on and off the
job, the worker’s marginal willingness to pay for job security is endogenous, increasing with the rent
received by a worker in his job, and depending on the behavior of all firms in the labor market. We solve
for the labor market equilibrium and find that wages increase with job security for at least all firms in
the risky tail of the distribution of firm-level unemployment risk. Unemployment becomes persistent for
low-wage and unemployed workers, a seeming pattern of ‘unemployment scarring’ created entirely by
firm heterogeneity. Higher in the wage distribution, workers can take wage cuts to move to more stable
employment.
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1 Introduction
When transitions to unemployment inflict a loss of income or utility, workers are willing to give up part of
their wages in exchange for more job security. The valuation of job security, however, differs in two funda-
mental ways from the valuation of other non-wage amenities (such as a company car or a short commute).
First, job security is naturally complementary to the desirability of the job along all dimensions, includ-
ing, prominently, the wage. For workers, losing a job that is only marginally better than unemployment is
less of a blow than losing the best possible job out there. Consequently, a given increase in job security is
valued more in high-wage than in low-wage jobs, ceteris paribus. In this paper, we show that the marginal
willingness to pay (MWP) for job security, i.e. the wage amount a worker is willing to give up for a marginal
increase in job security, is increasing and, with job-to-job mobility, also convex in the firm’s wage.
Second, in a frictional labor market, the cost of a job loss includes not only the immediate drop in income
upon unemployment, but also the impact on the worker’s subsequent labor market outcomes. The valuation
of job security therefore depends not only on the wage and conditions in the current job, but also on the
wages, job security, and other amenities of all other jobs offered, as well as on the extent of frictions in the
labor market. Since firms factor in the workers’ MWP for job security when setting their wage, the valuation
of job security is a true equilibrium object.
In this paper, we take the endogeneity of MWP for job security into account. We build an equilibrium
model in which firms with different levels of job security choose wages, and workers take jobs based on
wages and job security. We study how, in the resulting equilibrium, wages are associated with job security
levels. We show how job security is valued by workers and how it impacts worker flows. Our model
contrasts with standard hedonic wage models, because we incorporate the non-linearity and endogeneity of
job security’s amenity value, instead of treating it as an exogenously given constant across wage levels. (See
Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009), Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed (1998), and Sullivan and To (2013) for studies
of amenities with constant, exogenous MWP in frictional labor markets.).
We follow Burdett and Mortensen (1998) – BM – while introducing differences in unemployment risk as
firm traits.1 These differences among firms can be rationalized, e.g., as the result of differences in production
technology, with some firms providing more stable employment as a result of better management or more
adaptable production lines.2 While in our model time-constant worker flow rates to unemployment differ
exogenously across firms, our model is effectively isomorphic to one where firm-wide ‘layoff’ shocks imply
the same expected flow rates in each firm. In particular, we show in Pinheiro and Visschers (2014) that both
models imply the same equilibrium outcomes in terms of wages posted, wages earned, as well as job-to-job
and job-to-unemployment flows.3 Hence, the job security differences in our model may also capture more
1In order to isolate the impact of the job security channel, firms will not differ in the instantaneous output of productive workers.
2In Pinheiro and Visschers (2013), we formalized this in an environment where workers need to stay productive when their tasks
change over time. Safer firms are better able to provide the conditions under which workers become productive in new tasks, and
hence have a reduced probability of a dismissal.
3A positive correlation of entry into unemployment among the firm’s workers is shown to be irrelevant for the (risk-neutral)
workers and firms. Instead of losing some workers to unemployment with certainty in every time interval, firms effectively play a
lottery with the same expected loss of workers.
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generally, in reduced form, factors that affect the firm as a whole (e.g. differences in the volatility of firm’s
demand).
In our model, riskier firms need to increase their wages more than safer firms would in order to offer
the same job value to workers, but in so doing they do not gain as much in firm size as safer firms would.
As a result, in the equilibrium, riskier firms find it optimal to offer lower values to workers, and workers
move, job by job, towards increasingly safe firms. However, the fact that riskier firms offer lower-value
jobs than safer firms does not immediately imply that riskier firms offer lower-wage jobs than safer ones.
Since job values depend positively on both wages and job security, a higher job value could be (more than)
delivered by job security alone. We find that as the value of employment increases, the MWP for job
security increases convexly on the workers’ side. Therefore, especially for the safest firms, job security can
contribute significantly to job value.
Competition among firms also affects the values that firms offer to workers. The strength of this force
depends on how often firms compete for other firms’ workers, which depends on the on-the-job search
arrival rate and on the distribution of firm types in the economy. Overall, we show that, as long as the
density of the firm-level job security distribution is increasing, constant, or not decreasing too sharply, the
firm-competition force dominates the workers’ increasing MWP for job security. Consequently, wages may
only decrease with job security when the density of the firm-level job security distribution falls sharply with
job security. Only in this case will some workers accept wage cuts when moving to a new job. In terms of the
incidence of competition, we show that any negative relationship between job security and wages disappears
when the arrival rate of job offers to employed workers becomes high enough, for any distribution with full
support.
Our equilibrium is consistent with the lack of observed compensating wage differentials and a positive
correlation between wages and job security, as documented e.g. in Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) and Mayo
and Murray (1991). As a result of equilibrium wages that rise with job security in the lower tail of the job
security distribution (and possibly beyond it), the model is also consistent with the empirical observation
that a worker’s entry into unemployment often seems to leave a ‘scar’. Specifically, it implies a future,
beyond the worker’s current unemployment spell, in which he will work in short-lived low-wage jobs and
often suffer additional unemployment spells (e.g. Stevens 1997, Kletzer 1998).4 Such a pattern is observed
in our equilibrium, even though the heterogeneity lies entirely on the firms’ side and the worker is fully
aware of the type of firm before accepting a job.
In a setting with on-the-job search and a constant, exogenous MWP for an amenity, Hwang et al (1998)
show that low-amenity firms will offer lower job values, and hence wages do not necessarily compensate
for the lack of amenities. However, in their model, the comovement of wages and amenities can take
many forms, for example, the most desirable job could come with the lowest wages in the market. In
contrast, due to the crucial complementary of job security with the worker’s and firm’s rent, our model
4The reduction in subsequent employment durations is responsible for a significant part of the cost of a transition into unemploy-
ment (Eliason and Storrie 2006, Boheim and Taylor 2002, Arulampalam et al. 2000). Moreover, for displaced workers of a given
quality, commonly, new jobs come with lower wages, and simultaneously with a higher risk of renewed unemployment (Cappellari
and Jenkins 2008, Uhlendorff 2006, Stewart 2007). For recent work, see e.g. Jarosch (2014) and Krolikowski (2013).
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shows unambiguously that, for any firm distribution of job security, the lowest paid jobs will be the most
insecure ones.
Moreover, considering job security as a generic amenity (along the lines of Hwang et al.) misses that
more insecure firms also contribute differently to worker flows in the labor market. The risky firms’ low level
of job security implies that relatively large worker flows to unemployment originate from these firms – larger
than would originate from safer firms offering the same values. The risky firms’ resulting comparatively
smaller size reduces other firms’ incentives to poach workers from these firms. This influences optimal wage
choices of all firms in the market. As a result, to derive the firms’ sizes in our environment, it is necessary
to know the joint distribution of wages (or job values) and job security. Even though these requirements
constitute an addition of a dimension in the underlying equilibrium problem, we show how to derive the
equilibrium wage distribution in a way that is nearly as tractable as in BM.
As mentioned before, the valuation of job security not only depends on, but also shapes, the joint distri-
bution of offered wages and (un)employment conditions. Consequently, any changes in policies or parame-
ters that affect wages, unemployment values, the distribution of firms, or labor market flows, will typically
alter the valuation of job security, and thereby any choices that depend on this. In this paper, e.g., we derive
how the value of job security and – along with it – equilibrium wages change with the extent of frictions in
the labor market.
All in all, the equilibrium outcomes in our model imply larger and more persistent shocks in the lifetime
income process than in a corresponding model where all firms have the same, average, unemployment risk.
Due to differences in job security across firms, after a worker falls off the job ladder into unemployment,
the first rungs of the wage ladder will be more slippery than the higher rungs. With each step up on the
ladder, the worker lowers his chance of falling off. Therefore, bad (as well as good) labor market outcomes
can persist, and time and luck are needed before a recently unemployed worker can find traction on the job
ladder. Taking this type of firm heterogeneity into account may have further implications for understanding
workers’ decisions along other dimensions, such as saving and consumption decisions. On the flip side,
ignoring it could lead to a misperception of the deeper causes of income and employment risk, and thereby
to a misjudgement of the effectiveness of policies to address these.5
2 Model
A measure 1 of risk-neutral firms and a measure m of risk-neutral workers live forever in continuous time,
discounting the future at rate r. When not matched with a firm, a worker receives unemployment benefits b.
When matched with a firm, the worker produces output p, which is the same in any firm. Firms, however,
differ in the probability δ with which they send workers back into unemployment. We index firms by this
probability, and will refer to a high-δ firm as a “risky firm” and a low-δ firm as a “safe firm.”
The distribution function of firm types is H(δ). Apart from the differences in firms’ layoff risk δ, the
5For example, consider the case of labor market policies that aim to reduce repeated entrance into unemployment by improving
workers’ productivity. Then, the effect of these policies may be weaker than expected if the source of unemployment risk lies in
part with firms, and the policies do not change the type of firms in which the workers affected by the policies obtain employment.
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remaining setup follows Burdett and Mortensen (1998), i.e., there are search frictions in the labor market
such that unemployed workers receive at random a single job offer at a time at Poisson arrival rate λ0, while
employed workers do so at rate λ1. An offer is a wage-layoff risk combination (w, δ) which specifies the
wage w that a δ-firm commits to pay as long as the match lasts. The job offer must be accepted or rejected
on the spot, with no recall. Firms are able to hire everyone who accepts their wage. When setting profit
maximizing wages, firms take into account both the distribution of wages posted by other firms in the market
and also how workers compare wage offers from firms with different layoff risks. We first turn to workers’
decisions in the face of differentially-risky firms posting different wages.
2.1 Workers’ Job Offer Acceptance Decisions
Call V0 the life-time expected discounted income of a worker who is currently unemployed, and V (w, δ)
the value for a worker currently employed at a firm that pays wage w and has a layoff risk δ. Consider that
firms with layoff risk δ symmetrically post according to a possibly pure strategy with cumulative density
function Fˆ (w|δ). We can express the value functions of workers as follows: for an unemployed worker, the
flow Bellman equation is
rV0 = b+ λ0
∫ ∫
max{V (w, δ)− V0, 0}dFˆ (w|δ)dH(δ). (1)
The flow value of searching for a job when unemployed, rV0, equals the benefit flow b and the expected
capital gain of the job search. The latter, in the right-most term in equation (1), results from receiving,
at rate λ0, a job offer (w, δ) randomly drawn from
∫ ∫
dFˆ (w|δ)dH(δ). An accepted job offer (w, δ) will
improve the worker’s lifetime expected value by V (w, δ) − V0. Therefore, an offer will be accepted if and
only if this term is strictly positive. Similarly, the flow value for an employed worker at a δ-firm earning a
wage w is:
rV (w, δ) = w + λ1
∫ ∫
max{V (w′, δ′)− V (w, δ), 0}dFˆ (w′|δ′)dH(δ′) + δ(V0 − V (w, δ)). (2)
Therefore, the value of holding this job is given by the flow wage w plus the expected capital gain of
moving to a firm offering a higher employment value. Outside offers are received at rate λ1, randomly
drawn from
∫ ∫
dFˆ (w|δ)dH(δ). Offers are accepted if and only if V (w′, δ′) − V (w, δ) is strictly positive.
The worker also faces an expected capital loss from becoming unemployed, represented by the term δ(V0−
V (w, δ)).
Let’s consider how workers evaluate job offers from different firms. Assume a worker’s current employ-
ment in a firm with (w1, δ1), and consider an alternative job offer from a firm with (w2, δ2). The worker is
indifferent when V (w2, δ2) = V (w1, δ1); as equation (2) indicates, this occurs precisely when:
w2 = w1 + (δ2 − δ1)(V (w1, δ1)− V0). (3)
Then, if the worker, currently with V (w1, δ1), is offered a wage larger than w2 in a new firm with layoff
risk δ2, he will accept the new job, rejecting it otherwise. Thus, to move to a riskier firm, the worker needs
‘compensation’ in the form of a wage increase; this increase must cover the additional amount of risk taken
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on, multiplied by the cost of the layoff (V (w, δ)− V0). We will return to discuss the ‘value’ of job security
in more detail. Let us first use equation (3) to completely characterize the value V (w, δ) associated with
employment in any δ-firm at wage w. The reservation property and the established indifference condition
above, lead to
rV (w, δ) = w+ λ1
∫ ( ∫
w+(δ′−δ)(V (w,δ)−V0)
(
V (w′, δ′)− V (w, δ))dFˆ (w′|δ′))dH(δ′) + δ(V0 − V (w, δ)).
(4)
This implies that (given the indifference at the optimal acceptance choices),6
∂V (w, δ)
∂w
=
1
r + δ + λ1
∫ (
1− Fˆ (w+(δ′−δ)(V (w,δ)−V0)|δ′))dH(δ′) . (5)
To characterize V (w, δ) along the δ-dimension, we can similarly find
∂V (w, δ)
∂δ
= − V (w, δ)− V0
r + δ + λ1
∫ (
1− Fˆ (w+(δ′−δ)(V (w,δ)−V0)|δ′))dH(δ′) . (6)
Together with the relevant initial conditions, equations (5) and (6) form a system of differential equations
we can solve to fully characterize V (w, δ). This leads to the results stated in Lemma 1, where we define
w(V, δ) as the wage in a firm with layoff risk δ that implies a life-time expected value V to the worker.
Lemma 1. (a) Given the reservation wage out of unemployment R0 and wage distributions Fˆ (w|δ), the
value function of employed workers V (w, δ) is the solution to the system of partial differential equations,
defined by (5) and (6), with initial conditions for every δ defined by
w(V0, δ) = R0, and V0 =
λ0R0 − λ1b
r(λ0 − λ1) (7)
(b) In equilibrium, R0 satisfies
R0 = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫
V0
(V − V0)dF (V ) (8)
with
F (V ) =
∫
Fˆ (w(V, δ)|δ)dH(δ). (9)
We have relegated all proofs to the appendix. Lemma 1 shows that, given the reservation wage out
of unemployment, R0, it is possible to solve directly (in one iteration) for all values as a function of the
associated wage and the firm-level layoff risk V (w, δ). In the second part of the lemma, R0 is found as the
solution of the fixed point problem in (8), given the set of per-firm-type posting strategies Fˆ (w|δ) for every
type δ and the distribution of firm types H(δ). Notice that we can proceed to the firms’ maximization and
6In the standard Burdett and Mortensen, equation (5) it is given by dV (w)/dw = 1/(r+ δ+λ1(1−F (w))). Notice, however,
that in our setup the derivative dV (w)/dw is a function of both w and V (w, δ), instead of only the former, while V (w, δ) is
precisely the endogenous object that we are after.
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resulting distributions, leaving R0 implicit for the time being. Then, we find the equilibrium R0 as the fixed
point of a mapping with value distribution F (V ) incorporating all other equilibrium relations.
In the process of deriving Lemma 1, we have quantified the wage increase needed to offset a discrete
increase in unemployment risk, w2 − w1 = (δ2 − δ1)(V (w1, δ1) − V0). This difference is directly related
to the concept of the marginal willingness to pay (MWP), employed in hedonic estimations of the value of
job amenities, including job security. The MWP for job security is given by the derivative of the workers’
indifference curve in (w, δ)-space, which here is the derivative of equation (3) with respect to δ
MWP =
dw
dδ
∣∣∣∣
V constant
= −
∂V (w,δ)
∂δ
∂V (w,δ)
∂w
= V (w, δ)− V0. (10)
In equation (10), note that at the reservation wage out of unemployment, the marginal willingness to pay for
job security is zero.7 Intuitively, if an agent is indifferent between being in state A or B and there are no
transition costs, whether and how frequently the agent transits between A and B becomes irrelevant. Thus,
no compensating wages are required to hire out of unemployment even when R0 > b. As a result, the
reservation wage out of unemployment is identical for all firm types. This is why the initial condition in the
partial differential equation, R0, in Lemma 1, is invariant with δ in equation (7).
By contrast, at employment values strictly above the value of unemployment, a worker is willing to
give up some of his wage in exchange for an increase in job security. The amount of wage the worker is
willing to give up for the same difference in job security increases as the worker’s value in his current job
increases. Thus, there is an important complementarity between the attractiveness of a job, i.e. the rent
a worker receives in a job, and how much he values job security. Since the value of the job is increasing
and convex on the wage paid, the MWP can be easily shown to be increasing and convex in the wage paid,
ceteris paribus.8
Thus, the value of job security varies across firms. Naturally, this will affect the choices that different
firms will make. We turn to this next.
2.2 The Firm’s Problem and Labor Market Equilibrium
Given the value of an employed worker in a δ-firm at wage w, V (w, δ), we can define F (V, δ) as the joint
distribution of firm-level unemployment risk δ and firm-offered value V . Notice that the distribution F (V, δ)
is constructed by combining the distributions of equilibrium wages offered by each firm-type δ, Fˆ (w|δ), the
translation of values into wages w(V, δ) implied by V (w, δ), and the distribution of the firms’ layoff risk δ,
H(δ). Formally, F (V, δ) equals
∫
δ′≤δ Fˆ (w(V, δ
′))dH(δ′).
The steady-state measure of workers who are employed at values weakly below V , in firms with a layoff
7See also Burdett and Mortensen 1980.
8The derivative of the marginal willingness to pay with respect to w equals ∂V (w, δ)/∂w > 0 in equation (5). The second
derivative ∂2V (w, δ)/(∂w∂w) is also positive.
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risk rate weakly below δ, must satisfy∫
δ′≤δ,V0≤V ′≤V
(
δ′ + λ1
∫
V ′′>V
dF (V ′′, δ′′) + λ1
∫
δˆ>δ,
V≥V ′′>V ′
dF (V ′′, δ′′)
)
dG(V ′, δ′)(m− u) =
∫
δ′≤δ,V0≤V ′≤V
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
δ′′>δ,V ′′<V ′
dG(V ′′, δ′′)(m− u)
)
dF (V ′, δ′). (11)
where G(V, δ) is the distribution of employees across firms.9
The first line of equation (11) captures the outflows, consisting of (in order of appearance, under the
outer integral sign) the outflow to unemployment (δ′); to firms of any unemployment risk δ′′ that offer a
value V ′′ greater than V ; and, in the last term inside the integral, to firms with a higher unemployment risk
than δ which offer values V ′′ that are between worker’s current value V ′, and value V . The second line
accounts for the inflows, first from unemployment (λ0u), and second from riskier firms δ′′ > δ that offer
values V ′′ below the new firm’s V ′.
Notice that the distribution of employees across firms, G(V, δ) is pinned down by the steady-state equal-
ity of inflows and outflows in (11), together with the joint firm-type offer distribution F (V, δ).10 Denote,
with some abuse of notation, by F (V ) the marginal distribution of values offered by firms, and by G(V ) the
marginal distribution of employed workers over these values.
Lemma 2. The size of a firm posting a wage that induces worker’s value of V depends on F (V ), G(V ),
and on the firm’s own δ,
l(V, δ) =
λ0u+ λ1G
−(V )(m− u)
λ1(1− F+(V )) + δ , (12)
where G−(V ) =
∫
V ′<V dG(V
′, δ′), F+(V ) =
∫
V ′≤V dF (V
′, δ′).
Likewise for unemployment,
λ0u
∫
V≥V0
dF (V, δ) = (m− u)
∫
δdG(V, δ) (13)
The fact that the size of a firm will be affected by both the value (or wage) offered to the worker
and its own unemployment risk stands in contrast to BM and to Bontemps et al. (1999). Although their
models allow many sources of heterogeneity on the firm and worker sides, their equilibria keep the property
that firm size depends only on posted wages. As a direct consequence of the dependence of firm size on
both value V and unemployment risk δ in our model, the distribution function of workers across values,
G(V ) = (m−u)−1 ∫V ′≤V l(V ′, δ′)dF (V ′, δ′), depends also on the types of the firms that offer each value
V . Consider a subset of values which are offered predominantly by riskier firms; these firms send workers
into unemployment at a faster rate. If these firms offer high values, they will attract many workers, who will
be subjected to a high unemployment risk, generating a large inflow into unemployment. On the other hand,
if risky firms offer low values, only a smaller subset of employed workers will be subject to this increased
9Steady-state calculations are based on standard random matching. For more details, see Podczeck and Puzzello (2011). Note
that, since mass can be concentrated at a single (V, δ), we are explicit whether the boundaries are included in the integration.
10See details in Pinheiro and Visschers (2013).
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risk. Hence, the average unemployment risk in the labor market depends on the joint distribution of firm
types and values. Likewise, a firm’s recruitment inflow from other firms depends not only on the number of
firms that offer less attractive employment, but also on the layoff risk at these firms. If competitors offering
worse job values are predominantly risky firms, their size is relatively small compared to a case in which
safer firms offer these values. As a result, there are fewer employed workers that a firm can poach by offering
a higher value. Since unemployed workers accept any wage offer above R0, the relative benefit of offering
a high wage is lower in this case.
Formally, a firm with layoff rate δ chooses w to maximize (p−w)l(V (w, δ), δ).11 Combining Lemma 1
and Lemma 2, we can apply the monotone comparative statics arguments in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) to
derive that safer firms will offer better values, and the rank of the firm in the value distribution corresponds
to the ranking with respect to job security.
Proposition 1 (Ranking Property). Suppose in equilibrium a riskier firm (with layoff risk δr) and a safer firm
(with layoff risk δs, with δs < δr) offer wages of ws and wr, respectively. Then, we must have V (ws, δs) ≥
V (wr, δr).
Intuitively, a safer firm gains relatively more in firm size from offering a higher value, while giving up
strictly less (in relative terms) in profit per worker. Then, if Vr is optimal for the riskier firm, the safer firm
will strictly gain when offering Vs ≥ Vr. However, while Proposition 1 establishes that safer firms offer
better values, we cannot yet make inferences about the actual wages posted, since the higher job security
of safer firms by itself might deliver the higher value required in equilibrium. To work towards explicitly
linking firm types to wages in a tractable way, let us first define the steady state equilibrium.
Definition 1. The steady state equilibrium in this labor market consists of distributions Fˆ (w|δ), F (V, δ),
G(V, δ), F (V ), G(V ); an unemployment rate u; a value function V (w, δ) for employed workers, and a
value V0 and reservation wage R0 for unemployed workers, such that
1. workers’ utility maximization: optimal mobility decisions result in a value function V (w, δ) for em-
ployed workers, and a reservation wageR0, with associated value V0, according to equations. (5)-(9),
given Fˆ (w|δ) and H(δ).
2. Firms’ profit maximization: given F (V ), G(V ) and V (w, δ), for each δ, ∃ pi such that ∀ w ∈
supp Fˆ (w|δ), it holds that pi = (p−w)l(V (w, δ), δ) and ∀w /∈ supp Fˆ (w|δ), pi ≥ (p−w)l(V (w, δ), δ),
where l(V, δ) is given by (12).
3. steady state distributions follow from individual decisions aggregated up. For firms: F (V, δ) is de-
rived from Fˆ (w|δ) andH(δ) using V (w, δ). For workers: G(V, δ), and u follow from the steady state
labor market flow accounting in (11)-(13). ‘Aggregate’ value distributions F (V ) and G(V ) follow
from
∫
V ′≤V dF (V, δ), and
∫
V ′≤V dG(V, δ).
Then, following standard arguments in the literature (e.g. in BM), we can show that the marginal dis-
tribution of offered value V , denoted by F (V ), is a continuous and strictly increasing distribution function,
and so is G(V ).
11In Pinheiro and Visschers (2014), we show that the same maximization problem applies when a firm is subject to firm-wide
layoff risks that imply an expected unemployment risk δ for its workers.
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Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the distribution of posted values, F (V ), has the following properties: (i)
the support of the distribution is a connected set, (ii) there are no mass points in F (V ), and (iii) the lowest
value offered is V0, i.e. F (V0) = 0. Properties (i)-(iii) likewise hold for G(V ), the distribution of employed
workers across job values, which is derived from F (V ) and (11).
Combining propositions 1 and 2, it is easy to see that the conditional distribution of firm types that
offer value V , Fˆ−1(δ|V ), has all probability mass concentrated at a unique δ. Conversely, if H(δ) has a
continuous probability density, it also follows that each δ posts a unique value. This does not imply that an
actual wage w is offered by at most one δ-type of firm; overlaps in the actual wage distribution (with wage
cuts in transitions) are possible, as we show below.
2.3 Equilibrium Firm Sizes
The ‘ranking property’ in Proposition 1 tells us that, in equilibrium, offered values are decreasing with
unemployment risk. Therefore, a firm rank based on unemployment risk captures both the workers’ job-to-
job and job-to-unemployment flows. As a result, we can solve for equilibrium firm sizes as a function of
rank only.
We define firm rank as z = F (V ). Since the riskiest firm posts wages that generate a workers’ value
of V0 and F (V0) = 0, the riskiest firm has rank z = 0. Then, as we show in Proposition 2, F (V ) is
continuous and strictly increasing, implying that V (z) = F−1(z) exists and is unique. We can also define
the firm’s layoff risk as a function of equilibrium firm rank in the value distribution, δ(z); this is the layoff
risk associated with the zth firm, starting from the riskiest firm12. Then defining l(z) = l(V (z), δ(z)) and
Gz(z) = G(V (z)) using equation (12) allows us to rewrite the firm size and the cumulative distribution of
employed workers across firms as functions of the firm rank z only. From a change of variables (into z)
in G(V )(m − u) = ∫V ′≤V l(V ′, δ)dF (V ′, δ) and differentiating the resulting equation with respect to z, it
follows that l(z) = dGz(z)/dz. We can now solve explicitly for distribution Gz(z) and firm size l(z), as the
solution to differential equation
dGz(z)
dz
(m− u) = λ0u+ λ1G
z(z)(m− u)
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) , (14)
in the next lemma.13
Lemma 3. The cumulative distribution of employed workers at firms with rank lower than z,Gz(z), equilib-
rium firm size l(z) and the measure of unemployed, are given by: u = m
∫ 1
0 δ(z)g(z)dz
λ0+
∫ 1
0 δ(z)g(z)dz
= (λ0)
−1 ∫ 1
0 δ(z)l(z)dz,
and
Gz(z) =
λ0u
λ1(m− u)
(
e
∫ z
0
λ1
λ1(1−z′)+δ(z′)
dz′ − 1
)
, (15)
l(z) =
λ0u
λ1(1− z) + δ(z)e
∫ z
0
λ1
λ1(1−z)+δ(z′)
dz′
. (16)
12To formally deal with mass points in H(δ), define H(δ) as the closed graph of 1 − H(δ), then let δ(z) def=
max{δ|conv(H(δ)) = z}.Taking the maximum here is without loss of generality for our results, since alternative assumptions at
points where the convex closure of H(δ) is an interval would imply a different δ only for a zero measure of firms.
13A full derivation of (14) with detailed intermediate steps is in Pinheiro and Visschers (2013).
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The dependence of the size of the zth-ranked firm on the unemployment risks of all lower-ranked firms
is explicit in the integral term in the exponent. We believe that our approach is applicable more generally in
situations in which a firm-specific factor affects the firm size separately from the workers’ preferences. Our
procedure works as long as one can establish a mapping between this firm-specific factor and the equilibrium
rank in the distribution of offered values, as Proposition 1 does for unemployment risk.14
2.4 Equilibrium Wage Distributions
In the previous section, we derived equilibrium firm size as a function of firm rank in the value distribution.
In this section, we link these firm sizes to firms’ wage-setting. Consider the maximization problem of the
firm with the zth-lowest job security, which has to choose a lifetime value V to provide to its workers when
facing values offered by other firms according to distribution F :
max
V
(
p− w(V,δ(z))) ld(F (V ), δ(z)), for V ≥ V0; 0 otherwise. (17)
The term ld(F (V ), δ(z)) is the steady-state firm size of the z-ranked firm in the job security distribution,
with δ(z), which offers its workers a value V associated with rank F (V ) in the firm value offer distribution.
When a firm with unemployment risk δ offers the same value V as a firm with unemployment risk δ′, both
experience the same inflow, but the outflow of the δ-firm is larger by a fraction λ1(1−F (V ))+δλ1(1−F (V ))+δ′ . It follows
that the size of a firm with the z-th lowest job security, when it offers the z′-lowest value in the firm value
offer distribution, is
ld(z′, δ(z)) =
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z′)
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z) l(z
′) =
λ0u
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z)e
∫ z′
0
λ1
λ1(1−z˜)+δ(z˜)dz˜. (18)
Towards characterizing the solution of (17), note that an offer below V0 is strictly dominated by V0 itself,
which would yield a strictly positive rather than zero profit. Likewise, a value V > V¯ is strictly dominated
by V¯ , the highest value offered by the other firms, since V > V¯ implies that the firm pays higher wages for
no additional gain in acceptance or retention. Moreover, the maximand in (17) is continuous on [V0, V¯ ] for
distributions that satisfy the equilibrium properties derived in Proposition 2. Hence, the global maximum
exists in this interval. The firm’s first-order condition (which characterizes the optimum, proved in the
appendix) is
(p− w(V (z), δ(z))) ∂l
d(z′, δ(z))
∂z′
∣∣∣∣
z′=F (V )
dF (V )
dV
−
(
∂w(V (z), δ(z))
∂V
)
ld(z, δ(z)) = 0, (19)
where F (V ), by proposition 2, is continuous, strictly increasing, and, therefore, differentiable except pos-
sibly at measure-zero set of values V. Equilibrium requires that the z-ranked firm will choose value V such
that z = F (V ), for every z. Moreover, from proposition 2 it also follows that equation (19) holds for all but
14In a different setting, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) exploit the persistence of firm rank over time in an environment
with aggregate shocks. In their case, as in BM, a firm’s wage at a moment in time is a sufficient statistic for workers’ acceptance
and retention probability. In ours, differences in firms’ job security affect firms’ retention rates directly, implying that there is no
guarantee that the distribution of job values is indeed a rank-preserving transformation of the distribution of wages. In section 2.4,
we detail how to solve for both these distributions simultaneously.
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at most a measure zero of firms. Hence, we can define V (z) as the inverse of z = F (V ) and, associated with
it, dV/dF (V ) = dV (z)/dz, and substitute these into first-order condition (19).15 Then, firm optimization
in equilibrium results in
dV (z)
dz
=
(
p− w(V (z), δ(z))) · 1
r + δ(z) + λ1(1− z)
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) , (20)
where the right-most fractional term is the size elasticity of a δ-firm with respect to the rank it chooses to
occupy in F (V ),
∂ld(z′, δ)
∂z′
∣∣∣∣
z′=z
/
l(z, δ) =
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ . (21)
Equation (20) is a differential equation which captures how the offered job value needs to change with firm
rank z to guarantee that rank-z firms indeed find it profit-maximizing to offer V (z).
Due to firm heterogeneity, we cannot derive an explicit solution from (20) only, because V (z) and
w(V (z), δ(z)) cannot both be inferred from (20) alone. To see why, consider a firm with a given job secu-
rity that (potentially suboptimally) always offers the same value V to its workers: when facing a different
distribution of wages and job security, the firm would also need to offer a different wage to achieve an
unchanged level of V ; this wage cannot be derived from equation (20).
Therefore, to construct the equilibrium, we need to keep track of wages as they vary with value or, as
we do here, with firm rank. Notice that, at any differentiable δ(z), we have:16
dw(V (z), δ(z))
dz
=
∂w(V (z), δ(z))
∂V (z)
dV (z)
dz
+
∂w(V (z), δ(z))
∂δ(z)
δ′(z). (22)
We can decompose the equilibrium wage change with firm rank into two components. The first captures
the value change with firm rank, coming from the firm’s first-order condition of profit maximization (19),
∂w(V (z),δ(z))
∂V (z)
dV (z)
dz . The second effect comes from the distribution of firm types in the labor market, with
δ′(z), derived from H(δ), capturing how fast job security increases with firm rank. Substituting (19) into
the last expression yields:
dw(z)
dz
= (p− w(z)) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) + δ
′(z)(V (w(z), δ(z))− V0). (23)
Overall, while the firm’s optimization tells us dV (z)dz , the increased job security of the higher ranked firm
could itself deliver part of the increased value V. If workers value job security greatly (i.e. if V (w(z), δ(z))−
V0 is high) or if the higher-ranked firms’ job security is significantly higher (i.e. δ′(z) is far below zero),
firms with higher job security can even offer lower wages. Note, however, that e.g. equation (21) shows
that the gains of holding onto workers are also larger for more secure firms, and hence these safer firms
15In equilibrium, V (z) will in fact be differentiable whenever δ(z) is continuous. Theorem 1, below, will provide a complete
characterization, dealing with discontinuities in δ(z).
16Since it is derived from the cumulative density function H(δ) the function δ(z) is differentiable a.e. With abuse of notation,
we use δ′(z) as a function that is defined everywhere, and consistent with the derivative of δ(z) almost everywhere. (This at most
affects a zero measure of firms, and hence has no meaningful bearing on equilibrium outcomes.) Moreover, note that V (z) is
continuous everywhere; if there is a discontinuity in δ(z) at z, ‘compensating wage’ indifference (3) will tell us the size of the
discrete drop in wages at this z (as stated more explicitly in theorem 1).
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will compete more fiercely. It is therefore uncertain whether wages paid will rise or fall with firm-level job
security, even though worker values are strictly increasing with job security. In the next section, we will
study the conditions under which wages fall with job security.
The next theorem states the wages and values that follow from the system of differential equations
(20) and (23), with the appropriately derived initial conditions, together with a jump condition in case of
discontinuity of δ(z), indeed characterize the wages and values offered in the unique equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (Existence, Uniqueness, Characterization). Consider functions {w(z), V (z)}, andR0 ∈ R (and
the associated V0 = λ0R0−λ1br(λ0−λ1) ), such that w(z), V (z) are a solution to the system of two ODEs, represented
below, for all z at which δ(z) is continuous:
dV (z)
dz
= (p− w(z)) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z)
1
r + δ(z) + λ1(1− z) (24)
dw(z)
dz
= (p− w(z)) 2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) + δ
′(z)(V (z)− V0), (25)
and, in the case of a jump discontinuity at every ẑ such that limz↑ẑ δ(z) > δ(ẑ), w(z) will jump down
according to
w(z) = lim
z↑zˆ
w(ẑ)−
(
δ(z)− lim
z↑ẑ
δ(ẑ)
)
(V (z)− V0), (26)
V (z) = lim
z↑ẑ
V (ẑ) (27)
under initial conditions w(0) = R0, and V (0) = V0, where R0 additionally satisfies
R0 = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫ 1
0
(V (z)− V0)dz = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫ 1
0
(1− z)dV (z)
dz
dz (28)
Denote the inverse of V (z) as F (V ). This distribution, and G(V (z)) = Gz(z), value functions V (w, δ),
and u, Fˆ (w|δ), G(V, δ),F (V, δ), all constructed from {w(z), V (z), R0}, are the functions associated with
the steady state equilibrium in the environment; this steady state exists and is unique.
In our model, it has been necessary to follow a path different from BM and Bontemps et al. towards
characterizing the equilibrium wage distribution. The proof of Theorem 1 also relies on a different method
than in BM, as a result of the above-mentioned complications. Concretely, the strategy of the proof is to
show that – even though the problem has two dimensions, V (z) and w(z)– there still exists a term A(z)
which depends only on parameters, H(δ), and firm rank, such that p − w(z) = (p − R0)A(z). As an
important step towards this goal, the differential equation (25) can be rescaled by p− w, resulting in a term
V (z)−V0
p−w(z) is independent of R0. This means that the fractional division of overall rent between firm and
worker is a function only of parameters, unemployment risk distribution H(δ), and firm rank z — not of
R0. From this we can establish the needed properties of the mapping underlying the fixed point in R0 in
equation (28) for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
3 Wages and Transition Hazards
In the previous section, we derived equations that characterize how wages, workers’ values, and firm risk-
iness are linked in equilibrium. In this section, we look more specifically at the labor market outcomes
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implied by the characterization.
First, since safer jobs are more attractive jobs, workers in safe jobs are much less likely to transition
to unemployment or another job. Thus, our model produces an unemployment hazard that in the aggregate
declines with firm tenure, as it does in the data.17 We will refer to this particular transition rate as the
unemployment hazard. We formally present this outcome in the following result,
Result 1. The transition rate into unemployment as a function of tenure is decreasing.
Next, we consider the relationship between the layoff risk a worker faces and the wage he receives. If
wages are increasing with the firm job security, there is in some sense a strong failure of compensating wage
differentials. Not only do riskier firms offer lower employment values (as established in Proposition 1),
they offer values so much lower that, in addition to a higher unemployment risk, they actually pay lower
wages. For jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution, we obtain the following result without restrictions
on parameters or on the firm risk distribution.
Result 2. The lowest wage, R0, is paid by the firm with the highest unemployment risk. There exists a
nontrivial interval of wages [R0, wˆ] where job security increases with wages
Under typical conditions, spelled out next, this interval spans a large part of the wage distribution, while
wages may drop with job security higher in the wage distribution. For analytic simplicity and to be consistent
with steady state profit maximization, we let r → 0 also for workers and consider the standard case of a
distribution of firm unemployment risk with a differentiable density function h(δ).
Result 3. In equilibrium the relation between wages and job security depends on the firm distribution of
unemployment risk in the following way:
1. Wages increase with job security (i.e. dwdz > 0 at z˜, where z˜ = 1 − H(δ)), whenever the density is
constant or increasing in job security (equivalently, decreasing in unemployment risk δ, i.e. h′(δ) ≤ 0)
2. Wages will fall with increased job security if
h(δ)
δ + λ1(1−H(δ)) <
∫ δ¯
δ
h(δ˜)
(δ˜ + λ1(1−H(δ˜)))2
dδ˜ (29)
The first point highlights that in the lower tail of the job security distribution, wages will always increase
with job security. In single-peaked distributions of job security (1 − δ), wages increase at least up to the
mode of the distribution. Only when the density is strictly falling in job security can there be workers who,
in equilibrium, take wage cuts when moving to a more secure job. The second point tells us that we will
observe wage cuts upon job changes toward increased job security if equation (29) holds. Note that this
inequality requires a small enough λ1, in conjunction with a term h(δ)/δ which is decreasing fast enough in
job security. This could occur, e.g., when densities h(δ) have a tail with sufficient kurtosis. In particular, for
17See e.g. Menzio et al. 2012.
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λ1 close enough to zero, and a distribution of unemployment risk with
h(δ)
δ <
∫ δ¯
δ
1
δ˜
h(δ˜)
δ˜
dδ˜ over an interval
of δ, we can observe wages falling with job security.18
The degree of competition between firms is linked to parameter λ1; an increase in this parameter makes
it easier for higher-ranked firms to poach workers from lower-ranked firms, raising the extent of competition
among firms. When holding λ0 constant, thereby keeping unemployment an undesirable state from which
it takes time to escape, one would think that an increase in λ1 would lead firms to offer less dispersed
employment values in equilibrium. This increase in competition, then, would force job values to trace
workers’ marginal rate of substitution between job security and wages more closely. This intuition turns out
be incorrect; the increased competition among firms, in fact, pushes wages towards being increasing in job
security. For any continuously differentiable distribution H(δ) (with full support on a connected bounded
interval), we can find a finite λ˜1 such that above this λ˜1, for any λ0 and b, wages will be increasing with job
security throughout the distribution.19
Result 4. If λ1 > h′(δ)/(h(δ))2, wages will be increasing with job security at δ, for any λ0, b. If h′(δ)/(h(δ))2
is bounded from above, there exists λ˜1 such that for all λ1 > λ˜1 wages are increasing with job security for
all δ, for any b, λ0.
As the labor market gets more competitive, the scope for wage cuts for job security (when changing
jobs) disappears. Note that this bound holds for any b < p and λ0. Keeping λ0 constant means that the cost
of becoming unemployed stays bounded away from zero, even as λ1 becomes very large. (As λ1 →∞, the
cost of job loss goes to V1(δ)− V0 = p−br+λ0+δ .).
Thus, while lower wages with higher job security seem closely related to the notion of compensating
wages paid in competitive settings, their occurrence is actually associated with a low degree of competition
among firms in our environment. Though ironic, the result is intuitive. A low λ1 means that climbing up the
job ladder is a slow process in which any gains are lost upon becoming unemployed; therefore, at a lower
λ1, workers value job security more, ceteris paribus. At the same time, a lower λ1 reduces the competition
among firms, diminishing the relative gains of a higher value ranking for firms. As a result, higher ranked
firms do not increase the values offered as much.20
18In case of a discrete distribution, the existence of lower wages with higher job security will follow directly from condition
(26) in theorem 1. We discussed this type of wage patterns extensively in a previous version of the paper. This case however is
intuitively close to the case where h(δ) is very close to zero on an interval. In this case (29) implies that for h(δ) small enough over
an interval, wage cuts will also occur.
19Since the bound λ˜1 in Result 4 will be shown to be uniform in λ0, we also know that as the limit is approached in Result 4,
with both λ0 and λ1 going to infinity, wages will be increasing with job security for all δ, when λ1 > λ˜1.
20This, however, does not mean that Result 4 immediately follows from the intuition; as firm competition is reduced due to
market frictions, firms can use the additional market power to reduce worker values offered. This reduction has a negative impact
on the value of job security that could, potentially, more than offset the direct positive (ceteris paribus) effect of the decrease in λ1
on the workers’ valuation of job security. However, Result 4, using the explicit equilibrium characterization, shows that this is not
the case.
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4 Discussion
In this section, we further put our model in perspective. First, we discuss the role that the specification
of search frictions in the model plays in the results. Second, we briefly relate our results to the empirical
literature that estimates the value of amenities. Third, we discuss some of the theoretical and empirical
ramifications of unemployment risk that is firm-specific, rather than match- or worker-specific.
4.1 The Specification of Search Frictions
Two concrete aspects of the search frictions, as modeled, are the randomness of search and the presence of
on-the-job search. They are of very different importance for our results.
On-the-job search plays a key role, because it allows (imperfect) competition among firms, thereby cre-
ating heterogeneity in workers’ rents as well as rates of match termination due to employer-to-employer
transitions.21 In this setting, there is an interesting interaction between firm competition and the layoff risk
distribution across firms. In particular, workers care more about layoff risk, ceteris paribus, when there are
few jobs out there that offer better conditions – in terms of wages and security – than the current one. Simi-
larly, firms care relatively more about preventing workers from moving to competing firms when job matches
are generally more stable. This complementarity is missed in models that consider only unemployment-to-
employment and employment-to-unemployment flows.
Differently, the randomness of the search technology is not essential for our results. In a previous
version of this paper (Pinheiro and Visschers (2013)), we show in a directed search setting with job-to-job
mobility, adapted from Delacroix and Shi (2006), that safer firms likewise offer higher values than riskier
firms. At work is the same complementarity between the outflow rate to other jobs and the outflow rate to
unemployment, discussed above.
4.2 Estimation of the Amenity Value of Job Security
Job security, with the properties shown in this paper, is not a generic amenity, as the empirical literature has
often considered it. To deeper understand this distinction, it is worth taking a closer look at the empirical
literature on amenities. Perhaps the most-used method of valuing amenities is based on hedonic regressions
of (log) wages on amenity measures and controls, e.g. for worker quality (Thaler and Rosen (1976)). In its
most straightforward interpretation, the observed relationship between wages and amenities, often estimated
on a cross section of workers (controlling for observable worker differences), is thought to map out identical
workers’ indifference curves. To interpret the coefficients of amenities in hedonic regressions, typically, a
static utility function, linear and additively separable in wages and amenities, is posited. Then, in a perfectly
competitive world, an amenity’s coefficient can be interpreted as the workers’ MWP.
21There are other ways in which competition among firms can be introduced in models with search. Firm competition is present
in models of non-sequential search such as the noisy search model of Burdett and Judd (1982) and the non-dynamic models of
Butters (1977). Most of our qualitative results, as the lack of compensating differentials, would be preserved in a frictional model
without on-the-job search but with some form of stochastic direct firm competition. See also Lang and Majumdar (2004).
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However, the coefficients in these cross-section hedonic wage regressions are empirically problematic;
as pointed out already by Brown (1980), they are often statistically insignificant or have an unexpected sign.
Even after numerous attempts to control better for observable and unobservable worker heterogeneity, e.g.
in panel data, general support for compensating wage differentials from hedonic regressions has remained
inconclusive or weak.22
Hwang et al. (1998) and Lang and Majumdar (2004) show that in frictional labor markets, the empirical
cross-sectional relationship between wages and amenities can structurally deviate from the underlying MWP
of workers. For example, firms that are better at producing amenities, ceteris paribus, will choose to provide
higher overall utility to workers. Consequently, MWP as found in a hedonic wage regression will be biased
downward. Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009) take a partial equilibrium version of the setting of Hwang et al.
to the data and explicitly include job security in the set of amenities considered. They find a positive cross-
sectional correlation of wages and job security in many European countries but, simultaneously, a significant
MWP for job security.
In the aforementioned papers on amenities in frictional markets, workers, as in the standard hedonic
regression analysis, care about an amenity in a fundamental way; it enters in their flow (or per-period) utility
function, as a additively separable term. In contrast, when we substitute equations (1) and (2) into (10), we
can see that a worker’s care is, in some sense, instrumental: job security affects his future earnings stream
with a MWP equal to
MWP =
1
r
(
(w − b)− Φ(w, δ, F (V ))− δ(V (w, δ)− V0)
)
(30)
where Φ(w, δ, F (V )) equals
λ0[1− F (V (w, δ))](V (w, δ)− V0) + λ0
V (w,δ)∫
V0
(V −V0)dF (V ) + (λ1 − λ0)
∫
V (w,δ)
(V −V (w, δ))dF (V ) (31)
From equation (30), a number of further observations can be made directly. First, the MWP for job security
in this equation is inherently non-linear. There is no unique number that captures a value of job security that
is common to all workers in all firms. Rather, the value of job security is firm-specific. The first term on
the right-hand side captures (in part) that job security is valued more when the wage is high. Similarly, the
last term indicates that the lower the unemployment risk, the higher the value of a further increase in job
security.
Second, equations (30) and (31) show directly that, while the MWP for job security is firm-specific, it
also depends on the values offered by all other firms; that is, F (V ) enters the MWP explicitly. Third, in
the same vein, the extent of search frictions, captured in λ0, λ1, matters for the valuation of job security.
These factors are visible when spelling out Φ(w, δ, F (V )) in equation (31): the first term captures the ease
with which an unemployed worker can recover a job at least as good as his previous one. The next term
in Φ(w, δ, F (V )) captures the losses associated with employment inferior to the previous job. Because the
arrival rates of offers in unemployment might be higher or lower than in employment, the remaining term
captures that unemployment increases or decreases the likelihood of moving to jobs further up the ladder.
22This general conclusion is drawn e.g. in Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009).
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In addition to highlighting the non-linearity and endogeneity of the valuation of job security, this paper
also shows why firms find it optimal to set wages so that a positive relation between wages and job security
can arise, even when job security is highly valued by workers. Because the forces behind this positive
relation are especially strong at the lower end of the wage distribution, the model also yields the novel
testable prediction that if we estimate a compensating differential equation via quantile regression instead of
OLS, we should expect the MWP to be negative for the lowest quantiles, but possibly positive for low δ.23
It is worthwhile to reiterate that, since the value of job security is an endogenous object, many policy
changes have the potential to affect it; hence, care must be taken when using an estimated MWP as an
invariant input in policy experiments. This also applies to changes that affect labor market flows. For
example, Hwang et al. (1998) and Bonhomme and Jolivet (2006) argue that a decrease in labor market
frictions lowers the wedge between the empirical wage-amenity relation and the underlying MWP. While
appropriate for amenities with a fundamental value invariant to the extent of search frictions, in the case
of job security such a decrease would simultaneously lead workers to consider unemployment risk less
important, reducing the MWP for it.
4.3 Firm-specific Unemployment Risk
Our theory emphasizes that ex-ante known heterogeneity in unemployment risk across firms is consistent
with a number of labor market observations. In particular, our equilibrium is consistent with the pattern
of repeat-unemployment and observed decline in the workers’ probability of becoming unemployment as a
function of his firm tenure. However, two alternative theories can also rationalize the latter two empirical
patterns. First, these patterns can arise when less productive workers are also the most likely ones to become
unemployed. And second, these patterns may also emerge when the actual quality of a match is, apart from
an initial screening, uncertain at the start of a job and unemployed workers are more willing to accept the
matches with the highest unemployment risk.
However, these theories have very different implications for the distribution of income risk over workers
relative to ours. In our theory, a worker who has recently lost his job finds that jobs taken out of unem-
ployment are likely to end in unemployment again. As a result, unemployment amplifies uncertainty about
lifetime income for all workers, while job-to-job transitions imply an improvement not only of wages (typ-
ically), but also of job security. In contrast, when match quality is learned (in part) over the course of the
employment relationship, a transition to a new firm itself triggers an increase in uncertainty that could be
avoided by staying put in a match with a known quality. In a model that depends on worker heterogeneity,
rather than the firm-specific unemployment risk of our model, a high-quality, stable worker would sim-
ply not face the same prospect of repeat-unemployment and low wages that a typical unemployed worker
experiences.24
23We thank a referee for pointing this out.
24A correlation between wages and job security could occur because low-ability workers are also unstable workers: they prefer
not to stay with the same employer for long (Salop and Salop 1976). Alternatively, their skills are less job specific, making them
more mobile (Neal 1998), or they are repeatedly screened out during a lower-wage probationary period (Wang and Weiss 1998).
Sorting could also behind the worker-specific unemployment risk, with low-ability workers could also sort into risky firms (Evans
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Given these differences, it is interesting to gauge the empirical relevance of each of these theories. There
are signs in existing empirical investigations pointing towards the importance of firm and job match hetero-
geneity in workers’ unemployment outcomes. To set apart the role of unobservable worker heterogeneity in
unemployment outcomes, on one side, versus firm and match heterogeneity on the other side, one can look at
the employment histories of individual workers. If worker heterogeneity is important for unemployment pat-
terns, then the entire labor market history of a worker before a current unemployment spell is informative for
future labor market outcomes. In contrast, if only firm and match qualities matter, past matches with firms
become irrelevant when a worker becomes unemployed, and hence previous labor market history should not
predict future labor market outcomes. In general, after controlling for observable and unobservable worker
heterogeneity, the empirical literature indeed typically finds that the causal effect of an unemployment spell
on subsequent employment outcomes is substantial (see e.g. Arulampalam et al. (2000) and Böheim and
Taylor (2002)), thereby supporting the importance of firm and/or job match heterogeneity in unemployment
outcomes.
Moreover, one would wish to further distinguish between the roles of ex-ante known firm heterogeneity
and uncertainty about match quality in explaining unemployment outcomes. Empirically, there is room
to make further progress in this matter. For example, inside a firm, learning about match quality could
explain an unemployment hazard that potentially first increases with tenure, and subsequently decreases. In
contrast, ex-ante known differences among firms in unemployment risk, as captured in our model, could
shift up or down the firm-specific unemployment hazard (more uniformly) at any tenure, across different
firms. Longitudinal matched-employer-employee data could simultaneously allow for estimation of worker,
firm, and firm-tenure effects in the unemployment hazard. A potentially important role for ex-ante known
firm differences in unemployment risk is already suggested by findings that observable firm characteristics
correlate with the unemployment hazard after controlling for tenure effects (e.g. Winter-Ebmer 2001).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an equilibrium model in which workers’ willingness to pay for job security
does not arise from some deep discomfort in the utility function, but rather from the loss of life-time dis-
counted income. As a result, workers at different positions on the job ladder value job security differently,
and a complementarity between the job’s rent and security arises endogenously. We are able to character-
ize the joint distribution of equilibrium wages and job security in a very tractable way, making this model
amenable to further extensions and estimation.
Our theory emphasizes that a potentially large discrepancy can result between workers’ willingness to
pay for job security and the cross-sectional correlation between job security and the wages of homogeneous
workers. In particular in the lower part of the wage distribution, the forces that push towards the positive
correlation between wages and job security are strong. A further implication is that the unemployed are
the predominant takers of the riskiest low-pay jobs, with the consequence that unemployed workers are
and Leighton 1989, which could be modeled in a frictional labor market e.g. by extending Albrecht and Vroman (2002) with
on-the-job search and firm heterogeneity in layoff rates). See also Carrillo-Tudela and Kaas (2011)
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particularly vulnerable for ‘no-pay/low-pay’-cycles in their subsequent labor market outcomes. However,
differently from previous models, this seeming pattern of ‘unemployment scarring’ is neither a consequence
of a decline in workers’ (perceived) productivity when they become unemployed, nor a manifestation of a
selection effect on workers, but instead is driven fundamentally by firm heterogeneity.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1 What remains to be done is to fill in the few gaps that were not taken care of in the
main text. First, note that V (w, δ) exists as the fixed point of the functional mapping T : C → C
TV (w, δ) =
1
r + δ + λ1
(
w + λ1
∫ ∫
max{V (w′, δ′), V (w, δ), V0}dFˆ (w|δ)dH(δ) + δV0
)
. (32)
It further follows straightforwardly from the above equation that V (w, δ) is continuous, increasing in w, and
decreasing in δ when V (w, δ) ≥ V0. Given that the support of H(δ) and Fˆ (w|δ) is bounded by assumption,
V (w, δ) is bounded as well. Then, since V (w, δ) is monotone, continuous and bounded, it is also a.e. dif-
ferentiable with respect to w (Lomonosov and Foment (1975), 31.2, th. 6); similarly, it is a.e. differentiable
with respect to δ. At those points, using the right-hand side of equation (2) we find ∂V (w, δ)/∂w in (5).
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Again, similarly, we find ∂V (w, δ)/∂δ in (6). From equations (2) or (32), in particular the integration on the
right-hand side of these equations, it follows that V (w, δ) is in fact absolutely continuous (Kolmogorov and
Fomin (1975), 33.2 Th. 5), and therefore, the derivatives in (5) and (6), together with the initial conditions
characterize V (w, δ). (cf. Lomonosov and Foment, 33.2 Th. 6). At a zero measure set of points V (w, δ) is
not differentiable; in our formulation, we use (5)-(6) at those points, without affecting the solution V (w, δ).
The results for R0 and V0 in (7) follow from the compensating differential equation (3), which now
implies a reservation wage from unemploymentR0 that is unaffected by δ at value V (w, δ) = V0. Moreover,
substituting out the double integral term in (1), using V (R0, δ) = V0 in equation (2), yields V0 as a function
of R0 (or vice versa). As V (w, δ) is strictly increasing in w above V0, we can invert it (keeping δ fixed);
hence w(V, δ) exists, is continuous, strictly increasing, and a.e. differentiable. Changing the variable of
integration yields (8).
Proof of Lemma 2 In this proof, we show that the appropriate ratio of limits of a sequence of sets agrees
with (12) a.e. (with respect to F (V, δ)). (We do not have to worry about firm sizes at a set of measure zero
of firms for overall outcomes: anything that happens on a set of firms of measure zero will not affect the
choices or utility and profit attained by workers and other firms.) First, we can define
I(δ, V )
def
=
∫
δ′≤δ,V0≤V ′≤V
(
δ′ + λ1
∫
V˜ >V
dF (V˜ , δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜>δ,
V≥V˜ >V ′
dF (V˜ , δ˜)
)
dG(V ′, δ′)(m− u)
−
∫
δ′≤δ,V0≤V ′≤V
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
δ˜>δ,V˜ <V ′
dG(V˜ , δ˜)(m− u)
)
dF (V ′, δ′) (33)
Then, for δ′′ > δ′ and V ′′ > V ′, we have I(δ′′, V ′′) − I(δ′, V ′′) − I(δ′′, V ′) + I(δ′, V ′) = 0, because in
steady state I(δ, V ) = 0 for every (δ, V ). After some tedious algebra, in which we drop the flow-terms
that cancel each other out, add up the remaining flows where possible, but split the integral such that in one
set the upper bound is not included and in the other set the value to integrate over is a singleton {V ′′}; this
results in ∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V ′<V <V ′′
(
δ + λ1
∫
V˜ >V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
V <V˜≤V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜)
)
dG(V, δ)
+
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V=V ′′
(
δ + λ1
∫
V˜ >V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜)
)
dG(V, δ)
=
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V ′<V <V ′′
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
V˜≤V ′
dG(V˜ , δ˜) + λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
V ′≤V˜ <V
dG(V˜ , δ˜)
)
dF (V, δ)
+
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V=V ′′
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
V˜≤V ′
dG(V˜ , δ˜)
)
dF (V, δ) (34)
Now, we can take the limit as δ′ → δ′′ and V ′ → V ′′. There are two cases: (i) ∫V=V ′′,all δ dF (V, δ) = 0,
and (ii)
∫
V=V ′′,all δ dF (V, δ) > 0. In case (i), the terms on the second and fourth line equal zero, while the
rightmost terms in the integral on the first and third line are equal in value to an integral that has a strict upper
or lower bound on values, i.e. λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
V <V˜≤V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜) = λ1
∫
δ˜ /∈(δ′,δ′′]
V <V˜ <V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜)
def
= T (V, δ′). Moreover, T
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is continuous at (δ′′, V ′′), with T (δ′′, V ′′) = 0 , so we have
(δ + λ1(1− F (V ′′))
lim δ′→δ′′
V ′→V ′′
∫
δ′<δ<δ′′
V ′<V≤V ′′
dG(V, δ)
lim δ′→δ′′
V ′→V ′′
∫
δ′<δ<δ′′
V ′<V≤V ′′
dF (V, δ)
= (δ + λ1(1− F (V ′′))l(V ′′, δ) = λ0u+ λG(V ′′),
using that dG(V
′′,δ)
dF (V ′′,δ) = l(V
′′, δ), and that G(V ′′), F (V ′′) are continuous at V ′′. Rearranging yields (12).
For case (ii), we can first take the limit V ′ → V ′′ on both sides of the equation. The terms on the first
and third line go to zero. If the second and fourth line are zero as well, we are dealing a set {(V, δ)|V =
V ′′, δ ∈ (δ′, δ′′]} that is of measure zero in F , which without loss of generality for the aggregate patterns,
we can ignore. Suppose therefore that B(δ′, δ′′) def= {(V, δ)|V = V ′′, δ ∈ (δ′, δ′′]} is of positive measure.
Then in the limit as V ′ → V ′′ (34) reduces to∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V=V ′′
(
δ + λ1
∫
V˜ >V ′′
dF (V˜ , δ˜)
)
dG(V, δ) =
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V=V ′′
(
λ0u+ λ1
∫
V˜ <V ′′
dG(V˜ , δ˜)
)
dF (V, δ) (35)
Consider now the limit as δ′ → δ′′ while B(δ′, δ′′) stays of positive measure (if it becomes of zero measure,
we can ignore it, wlog). The terms between brackets inside the integrals stay constant, and hence can be
taken outside the integrals. Dividing both sides by
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V=V ′′
dF (V, δ), and taking the limit wrt δ, we have
(δ + λ1(1− F+(V ′′))
limδ′→δ′′
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V ′=V ′′
dG(V, δ)
limδ′→δ′′
∫
δ′<δ≤δ′′
V ′=V ′′
dF (V, δ)
= (δ + λ1(1− F+(V ′′))l(V ′′, δ) = λ0u+ λG−(V ′′),
where (1− F+(V ′′) = ∫V˜ >V ′′ dF (V˜ , δ˜) and G−(V ) = ∫V˜ <V ′′ dG(V˜ , δ˜). 
Proof of proposition 1 First of all, notice that the firm’s problem is given by pi(δ) = maxV (p −
w(V, δ))l(V, δ), where w(V, δ) is the wage that a δ-firm needs to pay to offer a value V to the worker.
Now, let us show the following claims:
Claim 1: p−w(V, δ) has decreasing differences in (V, δ), i.e. (p−w(V, δ))−(p−w(V ′, δ)), with V ≥ V ′,
is monotonically nonincreasing in δ.
Proof: Consider (p − w(V, δi)) − (p − w(V ′δi)) = w(V ′, δi) − w(V, δi), where V > V ′ and i ∈ {r, s}.
Rearranging it and substituting equation (3), we have (δr − δs)(V ′ − V0) − (δr − δs)(V − V0) = (δr −
δs)(V
′ − V ) ≤ 0. 
Claim 2: l(V, δ) satisfies decreasing differences, for any V, V ′ ≥ V0.
Proof: Consider l(V, δi)− l(V ′, δi), where V > V ′ and i ∈ {r, s}. Then, based on this expression, we have
[l(V, δr)− l(V ′, δr)]− [l(V, δs)− l(V ′, δs)] = [l(V, δr)− l(V, δs)]− [l(V ′, δr)− l(V ′, δs)]. Using eq. (13),
we can rewrite this expression as:
(δr−δs)×
[ λ0u+ λ1G−(V ′)(m− u)
(λ1(1− F+(V ′)) + δr)(λ1(1− F+(V ′)) + δs)−
λ0u+ λ1G
−(V )(m− u)
(λ1(1− F+(V )) + δr)(λ1(1− F+(V )) + δs)
]
,
which is negative. 
Therefore, (p−w(V, δ))l(V, δ) satisfies strictly decreasing differences. Then, according to Milgrom and
Shannon (1994), Theorem 5, V (δ) = argmaxV (p − w(V, δ))l(V, δ) is non-increasing in δ, i.e., V (δl) ≥
V (δh). 
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Proof of proposition 2. First, the same argument that established that G(V, δ) is absolutely continuous
with respect to F (V, δ) can be made to establish that F (V, δ) is absolutely continuous with respect to
G(V, δ), which then necessarily implies that each property (i)-(iii) applies to F (V ), if and only if it ap-
plies to G(V ). The proofs for properties (i)-(iii) follow the literature closely, and hence are omitted from the
main text.
Proof of theorem 1 There are three steps in this proof. First, one can show that the equilibrium objects
F (V ), G(V ), V (w, δ), Fˆ (w|δ), R0 constructed from V (z), w(z) satisfy workers’ and firms’ optimization.
This is straightforward, with this and the derivation in the paper, we have established that a steady state
equilibrium corresponds to {V (z), w(z), V0} and vice versa.25 The jump conditions follow directly from
the continuity of F (V ) in proposition 2, and equation (3). Second, we establish that the second-order
conditions are also satisfied whenever the first-order conditions hold. Finally, we show that the existence of
the equilibrium is guaranteed, and its uniqueness.
Pseudoconcavity of the firm’s problem Secondly, we have to check that the first-order conditions indeed
pick the maximum in the firm’s problem, at any point where δ(z) is continuous and differentiable. We
can verify that the problem is pseudo-concave, using dV (z)/dz in equation (25) and the firms’s first-order
condition (19) by showing the derivative of the first-order condition below is negative when (??) holds.
d
dz′
(
(p− w(V (z′), δ(z)))∂l
d(z′, δ(z))
∂z′
−
(
∂w(V (z′), δ(z))
∂V (z′)
dV (z′)
dz′
)
ld(z′, δ(z))
)
(36)
Evaluated at a point where the first order condition is equal to zero (z = z′), this has the same sign as
∂
∂z′
(
(p− w(V (z′), δ(z))) 2λ1
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z)
)
− ∂
∂z′
(
∂w(V (z′), δ(z))
∂V (z′)
∂V (z′)
∂z′
)
(37)
Evaluating the above term at z = z′, the second term equals ∂∂z′
(
(p− w(V (z′), δ(z))) 2λ1λ1(1−z′)+δ(z′)
)
,
which differs from the first, left-most, term only by δ(z) vs. δ(z′) in the denominator. Therefore, the only
term that does not cancel out between the first and second term of second-order condition (37) is
(p− w(V (z), δ(z)) δ
′(z)
(λ(1− z) + δ(z))2 < 0, (38)
which is negative, since δ′(z) < 0.
Existence and uniqueness of the fixed point R0. Finally, we have to show existence and uniqueness of
the reservation wage R0 = w(0), and associated V0 = λ0R0−λ1br(λ0−λ1) = V (0), satisfying (24), (25), (28). From
this, the existence and uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium then follows. Index dV (z;R0)dz ,
dw(z;R0)
dz by
initial condition R0; then (28) is the solution to the following fixed point
R0 = T (R0), where T (R0) = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫ 1
0
(1− z)dV (z;R0)
dz
dz (39)
25This in appendix B of Pinheiro and Visschers (2013).
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Note that dV (z)dz depends implicitly on the reservation only through (p− w(z)).
Manipulating (24) and (25), we can define x(z) = V (z)−V0p−w(z) and find that the system of two equations
dV (z)/dz and dw(z)/dz can equivalently be written as two equations of which one differential equation
only takes itself as argument,
d(p− w(z))
dz
= −(p− w(z))
(
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) + δ
′(z)x(z)
)
(40)
dx(z)
dz
=
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z)
1
r + λ1(1− z) + δ(z) +
(
2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z)
)
x(z) + δ′(z)x(z)2.
(41)
Note that p − w(0) = p − R0, and x(0) = 0. Note that d(p−w(z;R0))dR0 , by standard FODE theory, is
continuous in R0, and we will see this derived below as well. Consider first the interval [0, z˜] on which δ(z)
is continuous. On this interval, x(z) does not depend on R0. We can rewrite (40) to get
d(p−w(z))
dz
(p− w(z)) = −
(
2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z) + δ
′(z)x(z)
)
; (42)
Integrating over z yields
p− w(z) = e−
∫ z
0
(
2λ1
δ(z)+λ1(1−z) +δ
′(z)x(z)
)
dz
(p−R0), (43)
where the exponential term does not depend on R0. It follows immediately that
d(p− w(z))
dR0
= −e−
∫ z
0
(
2λ1
δ(z)+λ1(1−z) +δ
′(z)x(z)
)
dz
< 0.
To generalize this to general distributions H(δ), consider next a point where δ(z) is discontinuous: this a
point where δ(z) drops discretely. We want to show that the properties of d(p−w(z))dR0 ,
dx(z)
dR0
are preserved.
Consider first x(z), from (26), which in turn comes from the worker’s indifference curve in equation (3),
(p− w(zˇ)) = lim
z↑zˇ
(p− w(z))− (δ(zˇ)− lim
z↑zˇ
δ(z))(V (z)− V0) (44)
To shorten notation, let, for a generic function y(z), the limit limz↑zˇ y(z) be denoted by yL(z). Then we can
rewrite the above equation (44) as(
x(z)
)−1
=
(
xL(z)
)−1 − (δ(z)− δL(z)) ⇐⇒ x(z) = xL(z)
xL(z)− (δ(z)− δL(z)) (45)
Hence, if dxL(z;R0)/dR0 = 0, it follows that dx(z;R0)/dR0 = 0.
Thus, the irresponsiveness of dx(z)dR0 is also preserved whenever δ(z) drops discretely. Let Z = {ζi}
be the countable set of ranks z at which δ(z) drops discretely; define additionally ζ0 = 0. Then, letting
ζ¯(z) = sup{ζ ∈ Z|ζ < z}
p− w(z) = (p−R0)
( ∏
{i|ζi∈Z,ζi<z}
e
− ∫ ζiζi−1( 2λ1δ(z′)+λ1(1−z′) +δ′(z′)x(z′))dz′( xL(ζi)
xL(ζi)− (δ(ζi)− δL(ζi))
)
· e−
∫ z
ζ¯(z)
(
2λ1
δ(z′)+λ1(1−z′)
+δ′(z′)x(z′)
))
⇐⇒ (46)
p− w(z) = (p−R0)A(z), (47)
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summarizing the entire bracketed term, which only depends on firm rank z and fundamentals but not on R0,
in equation (46) into term A(z) in (47). 26 From this it immediately follows that d(p−w(z;R0))dR0 = −A(z) < 0.
Moreover the T (R0) mapping becomes
T (R0) = b+ (p−R0)(λ0 − λ1)
∫ 1
0
2λ1(1− z′)
λ1(1− z′) + δ(z′)
1
r + δ(z′) + λ1(1− z′)A(z
′)dz′ (48)
Denoting the term post-multiplying (p − R0) by B, we find R0 = (b/p+B)1+B p, which for any b ≤ p gives the
reservation wage R0. This establishes the existence, and the uniqueness of the equilibrium reservation wage
of the unemployed, and given the existence and uniqueness of the firm posting and workers’ value function
given the reservation wage R0, it establishes the overall existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium|. 
Proof of Result 1 The inflow into employment λ0u+λG(z) = l(z)(δ(z)+λ(1−z)), the probability that
an inflow at time t survives until t + τ is e(δ(z)+λ1(1−z))τ ; thus the number of workers in the zth firm who
have been around τ periods teu(z, τ)
def
= l(z)(δ(z) + λ(1− z)e−(δ(z)+λ(1−z))τ . Then, the derivative of the
empirical hazard rate with respect to tenure is
d ln
(∫ 1
0 δ(z)teu(z, τ)dz∫ 1
0 teu(z, τ)dz
)/
dτ = −
∫ 1
0
(δ(z)− δave)teu(z, τ) (δ(z) + λ1(1− z))dz∫
δaveteu(z′, τ)dz′
< 0 (49)
The derivative dteu(z, τ)/dτ = −teu(z, τ)(δ(z)+λ1(1−z)). Define δave
∫
teu(z
′, τ)dz′ =
∫
δ(z′)teu(z′, τ)dz′.
Then
∫ 1
0 (δ(z) − δave)teu(z, τ)dz equals zero; since δ(z) − δave and (δ + λ1(1 − z)) are both decreasing,
the latter one strictly, the integral term in (49) is positive, establishing the result.
Proof of Result 2 We have to make sure not only that w(z) is increasing on an interval [0, z˜] itself, but
also that there exists an interval [0, zˇ] where additionally for no further z > zˇ we have that w(z) < w(z˜).
By theorem 1, locally, for z close 0, we have w(z) strictly increasing, while by proposition 2 V (z) strictly
increasing everywhere. Then immediately there exists z˜ > 0 such that w(z) is strictly increasing for all
0 < z < z˜. Now, towards a contradiction, suppose that there does not exist a zˇ > 0 such that for all z > z˜,
it holds that w(z) > w(zˇ). Then, there must exist a sequence {zn} with zn > zˇ, such that w(zn)→ R0. By
(3), then also V (zn) → V0. But then, there exists an n such that V (zn) < V (zˇ), contradicting the ranking
property/the strict monotonicity of V (z).
Proof of Result 3 Note that since dw(0)/dz > 0, at the zˇ from which onwards an interval of wage cuts
occurs, both dw(zˇ)/dz = 0 and d2w∗(zˇ)/(dzdz) < 0, i.e. dw∗(z)/dz cuts 0 from above, at zˇ. Note that a
26A similar result holds true in the standard Burdett and Mortensen model, where
p− w(z) = (p−R0)
(
λ1(1− z) + δ
λ1 + δ
)2
,
however, here we have take care of the heterogeneity in δ, and the resulting influence on the wages (with wage cuts etc.). Notice
that if we set δ′(z) = 0 and hence ∆(z) = 0 and x(z) = 0 ∀z, the Burdett and Mortensen result in fact follows. The observation
that a similar property is preserved in our more complicated setting is encouraging for the wider applicability of the BM-type wage
posting framework, e.g. when incorporating further heterogeneity.
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point at which first and second derivative are zero will not translate in any wage cuts, or strict decrease of
wage in job security. The second derivative at zˇ equals
d2w∗
dzdz
= −dw
∗
dz
2λ1
λ1(1− z) + δ(z) + (p− w
∗(z))
2λ1(λ1 − δ′(z))
(λ1(1− z) + δ(z))2 + δ
′′(V (ws(z), δ)− V0)
+ δ′(z)
dV (z)
dz
. (50)
Note that after substituting in dV (z)/dz from (24), the terms with δ′(z) cancel out. Evaluated at a point
where dw/dz = 0, and letting r → 0, this turns into
d2w∗
dzdz
∣∣∣∣
dw∗
dz
=0
= (p− w∗(z)) 2λ
2
1
(λ1(1− z) + δ(z))2 + δ
′′(V (ws(z), δ)− V0) (51)
This can be smaller than zero only if δ′′(z) < 0, which in turn occurs if and only if h′(δ) > 0, since
δ′(z) = −1/h(δ) and δ′′(z) = h′(δ)
h(δ)2
δ′(z).
The second point follows from (25) being negative. Substituting in V (z) − V0 =
∫ z
0 dV (z)/dzdz
into dw(z)/dz in equation (25), a change of the integrating variable (dz = −h(δ)dδ), this can be written
equivalently as
(p− w(1−H(δ))) 2λ1
δ + λ1(1−H(δ)) <
1
h(δ)
∫ δ¯
δ
2λ1
(δ˜ + λ(1−H(δ˜)))2 (p− w(1−H(δ˜)))h(δ˜)dδ˜
Since p − w((1 −H(δ˜))) > p − w(1 −H(δ)) for δ˜ > δ if no other wage cuts with increased job security
have occurred, the above equation will be negative whenever (29) holds. (In the other case, if wage cuts
have occurred lower in the value distribution (at lower z), then point 2. holds trivially.)
Proof of Result 4 We can show this by establishing that d
2w(z˜)
dwdw < 0, and
dw(z˜)
dz = 0 cannot occur for
λ1 >
h′(δ)
(h(δ))2
. Note that the existence of wage cuts implies a z such that dw(z)/dz = 0, d
2w(z)
dzdz ≤ 0. This
implies that at that z, from (25) and (51),
(p− w(z)) 2(λ1)
2
δ(z) + λ1(1− z) < −δ
′′(z)
∫ z
0
dV (z′)
dz′
dz (52)
(p− w(z)) 2λ1
δ(z) + λ1(1− z) = −δ
′(z)
∫ z
0
dV (z′)
dz′
dz (53)
Dividing the RHS of (52) by the RHS of (53), and similarly for the LHS, this yields
λ1 < δ
′′(z)/δ′(z) =
h′(δ)
(h(δ))2
as a necessary condition. Hence if λ1 >
h′(δ)
(h(δ))2
, we do not satisfy the necessary condition, and therefore can
rule out dw(z)/dz < 0 at z = 1−H(δ).
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